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COLLOQUIUM
THE SUPREME COURT'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
DOCKET: PROCEEDINGS FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES*
Introduction
THE HONORABLE MARSHALL J. BREGER**
Chairman Breger: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. My name
is Marshall Breger. I am chairman of the Administrative Conference of
the United States (Administrative Conference or Conference).
As most of you know, the Administrative Conference is an indepen-
dent agency charged with studying and promoting fairness and effi-
ciency in federal administrative processes. Stated another way, the
Conference is the Federal Government's administrative law expert and
think tank.
Today's colloquy, "The Supreme Court's Administrative Law
Docket," will focus on Supreme Court cases decided last term that
dealt with administrative law questions. We hope that this will become
a yearly event at the Conference. However, our distinguished panel of
speakers has been invited to go beyond discussion of the past and to
speculate a little about the significance those decisions have for the fu-
ture. You, of course, are invited to, by your questions, encourage them
to explore further.
Supreme Court jurisprudence has always been closely intertwined
with administrative law. In its early years, American administrative
law was taught together with constitutional law under the rubric of
* The Conference reproduced here as edited was held at the American Society of
Association Executives in Washington, D.C, on September 19, 1991. The participants
were asked to discuss the major cases decided by the United States Supreme Court in
the preceding term.
** Solicitor, United States Department of Labor. B.A., M.A., 1967, J.D., 1973,
University of Pennsylvania; B. Phil., 1970, Oriel College, Oxford University. At the
time of this Conference, Mr. Breger was the Chairman of the Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States.
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"public law." ' It focused on such "big-picture" questions as the impli-
cation of separation of powers, the delegation of legislative authority,
and the nature of judicial review.
With the coming of the New Deal, and later the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act,2 the emphasis of administrative law shifted from questions
of legitimacy and accountability to the procedures governing agency
adjudication and rulemaking. Administrative law became, if you will,
the study of the civil procedure of agency practice.
In recent years, administrative law has returned to questions of dem-
ocratic theory and the allocation of power among the branches of gov-
ernment. I think this is a good thing. This renewed interest encom-
passes such topics as the distribution of powers between the branches,
judicial deference to agency interpretations, the famed Chevron doc-
trine,3 presidential oversight of agency rulemaking, and the meaning of
due process in informal administrative adjudications.
The Court's administrative law decisions last term reflect this shift
back to "big-picture" questions. I believe the Court's administrative
law docket can be broken out into several categories. First, there are
those decisions that deal with separation of powers and delegation of
powers under the Constitution. One such case is Metropolitan Wash-
ington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise" wherein the Supreme Court affirmed the District of Columbia
Circuit's conclusion that a Board of Review created by Congress to
oversee the regional airport authority violated separation of powers
principles. The Court reasoned that the Board could exercise an execu-
tive function, yet consist of selected Members of Congress. 5 The Court
reached this conclusion even though the Board members were ap-
pointed to serve in their personal, not in their official, legislative
capacities.
Another decision in this category is Freytag v. Commissioner of In-
1. "Public law" is the general field of law concerned with the structure of govern-ment and the relationship between citizens and their government. Thus, a standardpublic law periodical in Great Britain might include commentary on such subjects asconstitutional law, public administration, and administrative law issues. "Private law,"in contrast, concerns itself with the resolution of disputes between private persons. Seegenerally PuB. LAW (Stevens & Son, Co., London, England, United Kingdom, 1956-1991) (providing overview of public law in Great Britain).2. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified at 5U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (1988)).3. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
4. - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 2298 (1991).
5. Id. at 2311-12.
SUPREME COURT DOCKET
ternal Revenue6 involving a challenge to the Tax Reform Act, which
authorized the chief judge of the Tax Court, a so-called Article I court,
to appoint commissioners, now called special trial judges. The Supreme
Court held that the chief judge's power to designate such special trial
judges to preside over any proceeding, regardless of complexity or
amount, does not run afoul of the Appointments Clause of Article II of
the Constitution.7 The Appointments Clause, as you may recall, re-
quires the President to nominate and the Senate to approve, "officers of
the United States,"" but it allows Congress to vest the appointment of
"inferior officers in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments."9
The Court concluded that a special trial judge is an "inferior officer"
and must be appointed as prescribed in Article 11.10 A majority went
on to find the appointment valid because the Tax Court is a "court of
law" within the meaning of Article II.11
The final decision in this category is Touby v. United States.
12 In
Touby, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to an amendment to
the Controlled Substances Act, which authorized the Attorney General
to classify on a temporary, emergency basis controlled substances.
1 3
The challengers claimed that the statute violated the non-delegation
doctrine,14 which generally provides that Congress may not constitu-
tionally delegate its legislative power to another branch of government.
However, the courts have consistently upheld delegations of power to
the executive branch as long as Congress establishes "an intelligible
principle" that can be followed by the delegate.
1 5 The Court concluded
that the delegation in question met that test.""
The second category of Supreme Court administrative law decisions
are those which address questions of deference to agency interpreta-
tions and actions, a category familiar to most as the Chevron doctrine
cases. In Rust v. Sullivan,17 the Supreme Court upheld, against a con-
stitutional attack, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
regulations that limit the ability of federally funded family planning
6. - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 2631 (1991).
7. U.S. CONST. art: II, § 2, cl. 2.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Freytag, 111 S. Ct. at 2640.
11. Id. at 2645.
12. - U.S. --, Ill S. Ct. 1752 (1991).
13. Id. at 1758.
14. Id. at 1756-58.
15. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
16. Touby, 111 S. Ct. at 1756-57.
17. Id. at 1759.
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clinics to counsel patients about the use of abortion as a method of
family planning. In doing so, the majority relied in part on Chevron
jurisprudence.18
A curious case raising the issue of judicial deference to agency inter-
pretations is Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines.19 Pauley involved the black
lung benefits program originally created by Congress in 1969 to be ad-
ministered by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW). The HEW Secretary was authorized to promulgate regula-
tions regarding the determination and adjudication of claims.2 0 Con-
gress later amended the law, assigning responsibility away from HEW
to the Department of Labor (DOL). However, Congress provided that
any new criteria established by the Labor Secretary "shall not be more
restrictive than the criteria ' 21 earlier adopted by HEW.
DOL's regulations were challenged as violating this provision, yet the
Supreme Court held that the DOL's rules were entitled to judicial def-
erence,22 over the objection of Justice Scalia. Justice Scalia objected tothe fact that the deference was through the DOL, even though the
rules initially were set out by HEW.2
The third category of Supreme Court administrative law decisions
addresses standing, ripeness, and exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies, the "gatekeeping" doctrines which determine whether or not par-
ties can have their claims or grievances heard in federal court. Al-
though these cases were not numerous in the last term, this is an area
that appears to be evolving, or at least moving, in the Court's
jurisprudence.
One standing case decided last term was Air Courier Conference of
America v. American Postal Workers Union, 4 in which the Court held
that the District of Columbia Circuit misapplied the zone of interests
test, as explained by the Court in Clarke v. Securities Industry
Association.25
Far more attention, however, was focused on a case to be decided
this coming term. It involves an appeal from the Eighth Circuit deci-
18. Rust, III S. Ct. at 1767.
19. - U.S. _, 111 S. Ct. 2524 (1991).
20. 30 U.S.C. § 921 (1988).
21. 30 U.S.C. § 902(F)(2) (1988).
22. Pauley, I11 S. Ct. at 2534-35.
23. Id. at 2540 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
24. - U.S. -. I, 111 S. Ct. 913 (1991).




sion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,"6 which held that the environ-
mental group had standing to challenge a Department of Interior regu-
lation interpreting the Endangered Species Act to not apply to actions
taken in foreign countries. The interest in this case stems from its simi-
larity to Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,7 in which the Court
denied the National Wildlife Federation standing to challenge the Bu-
reau of Land Management's land withdrawal review program.
8
This review of cases is not exhaustive. It is a brief introduction, how-
ever, to the Court's administrative law docket of last year.
Our distinguished speakers will take it from here and, most impor-
tant, tell us what these cases really mean. Leading off, focusing on sep-
aration of powers cases, is Theodore B. Olson, a partner in the law firm
of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. Mr. Olson is a litigator with extensive
experience in the fields of constitutional law, media litigation, commer-
cial disputes, and appellate practice, including appearances before the
Supreme Court. Between 1981 and 1984, he was the Assistant Attor-
ney General at the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). OLC, as you may
well know, formulates and articulates the Executive's position on con-
stitutional issues. Mr. Olson is a member of the Administrative Confer-
ence, as well as a member of the Council of the American Bar Associa-
tion's (ABA) Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice.
Mr. Olson will be followed by Professor Thomas 0. Sargentich, who
will comment on the state of the Chevron doctrine. Professor Sargen-
tich teaches at the Washington College of Law, The American Univer-
sity, and has written extensively on administrative and constitutional
law issues. Tom also is an alumnus of the OLC, serving there from
1978 to 1983.
Our last speaker will be Professor William F. Funk, who will address
recent Court cases dealing with standing and ripeness and what the
future may hold in this area. Professor Funk currently teaches at the
Lewis and Clark Northwestern School of Law. Prior to joining the aca-
demic ranks, he served at the Department of Energy, on the staff of the
House Intelligence Committee, and also in the OLC at the Department
of Justice.
As you will note, you have to have worked at OLC to be a panelist.
Without that credit on your resume, you are reduced to being a
moderator.
Following the speakers' presentations, I will invite the speakers to
26. 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1991).
27. - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
28. Id. at 3187.
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argue and debate amongst each other. After this exchange, I will invite
questions from the floor.
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE SUPREME COURT:
IMPLICATIONS AND POSSIBLE TRENDS
THEODORE B. OLSON, ESQ.*
Mr. Olson: As I look around this room, I see a powerful array of
expertise on the subjects that we are discussing today. I am sure that
my co-panelists feel as I do that we are engaging today in a colloquy
and not a presentation. So perhaps we should regard our role as simply
getting the discussion started by turning to the cases the Supreme
Court decided last year.
I will discuss the three cases on separation of powers that Marshall
mentioned. Just to confuse you, I will discuss them in the reverse order.
The Supreme Court did decide three cases last term that have impli-
cations for the separation of powers. The first, Touby v. United
States,2 involves the extent to which Congress can delegate legislative,
or what might be regarded as legislative, power to the executive
branch.
The Controlled Substances Act"0 authorizes the Attorney General to
specify products, the manufacture, possession, sale, or distribution ofwhich may subject an individual to criminal prosecution."1 The statute
articulates some fairly specific standards to which the Attorney Gen-
eral must adhere when designating a substance for inclusion on the
controlled substance list. He must start by having the affirmative rec-
ommendation by the Secretary of HHS'l and must then consider a
number of very specific factors.3 3 There is also a process of review and
* Mr. Olson is a partner at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher in Washington, D.C. B.A.,
cum laude, 1962, University of the Pacific; LL.B., 1965, Boalt Hall School of Law,University of California. He was formerly the Assistant Attorney General with the
Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice.
29. - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 1752 (1991).
30. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-889 (1988).
31. Id. § 811(a).
32. Id. § 811(b) (stating that recommendations of Secretary shall be binding onAttorney General, and if Secretary recommends that drug or other substance not becontrolled, Attorney General shall not control drug or other substance).33. Id. § 811(c) (listing factors: (1) its actual or relative potential for abuse; (2)scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known; (3) state of current scientificknowledge regarding the drug or other substance; (4) its history and current pattern ofabuse; (5) scope, duration, and significance of abuse; (6) what, if any, risk there is topublic health; (7) its psychic or physiological dependence liability; (8) whether sub-stance is immediate precursor of substance already controlled under this subchapter).
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